Philosophy of Language 논문 정리

Jae-Hwan

이 글은 영미 언어철학을 공부하는데 필요한 논문의 이름을 정리한 글입니다. 필요하신 분은 아래를 클릭해주세요!

다음에서 소개할 논문들의 출처는 다음과 같은 약자로 표시 합니다.

L = Peter Ludlow. Readings in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.

M3 = A. P. Martinich. The Philosophy of Language. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

M4 = A. P. Martinich. The Philosophy of Language. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

RT = Jay F. Rosenberg and Charles Travis. Readings in the Philosophy of Language. Prentice Hall, 1971.

기본적으로 미리 읽어야 할 책들

Kenneth Taylor. Truth and Meaning. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998.

Bob Hale and Crispin Wright. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997

Scott Soames. Understanding Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999

읽어야 할 논문

분야: Truth and meaning

Gottlob Frege. The thought (1925). L 9-30

Alfred Tarski. The semantic conception of truth (1944). M3 61-84, M4 69-91, L

H. P. Grice. Meaning (1957). M3 85-91, M4 92-97

Donald Davidson. Truth and meaning (1967). L 89-108, M3 92-103, M4 98-109

P. F. Strawson. Meaning and Truth (1970). M3 104-114, M4 110-119

분야: The analytic/synthetic distinction

W. V. O. Quine. Two dogmas of empiricism (1951). M3 39-52, M4 47-60, RT 63-80

H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson. In defense of a dogma (1956) RT 81-93

Hilary Putnam. The analytic and the synthetic (1966) RT 94-125

Aaron Sloman, “Necessary”, “a priori” and “analytic”, Analysis 26, 1965-6, pp. 12-16.

Saul Kripke. Naming and necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980. Lecture I.

분야: Reference, descriptions, proper names

Gottlob Frege. On sense and reference/nominatum (1892). L 563-584, M3 186-198, M4 199-211

Bertrand Russell. On denoting (1905). M3 199-207, M4 212-220

Bertrand Russell. Descriptions (1919). L 323-335, M3 208-214, M4 221-227, RT 166-174

P. F. Strawson. On referring (1950). L 335-360, M3 215-230, M4 228-242, RT 175-194

John Searle. Proper names (1958). L 585-592, M3 249-254, RT 212-218

Keith Donnellan. Reference and definite descriptions (1966). L 361-382, M3 231-243, M4 247-258, RT 195-211

Gareth Evans. The causal theory of names (1973). L 635-656, M3 271-284, M4 296-307

Saul Kripke. Speaker’s reference and semantic reference. L 383-414

Saul Kripke. Naming and necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980. Lecture I and II

Hilary Putnam. Meaning and reference (1973). M3 284-291, M4 288-295

David Kaplan. Demonstratives. In: Joseph Almog and John Perry (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, 481-563

Nathan Salmon, Reference and information content. In Handbook of Philosophical Logic IV

분야: Propositional attitudes

W. V. O. Quine. Quantifiers and propositional attitudes (1956) Jac 285-291, M3 330-336, M4 355-360

Donald Davidson. On saying that (1968) L 817-832, M3 337-346, M4 361-370

David Kaplan. Quantifying In (1968) Jac 318-337, M3 347-368, M4 371-391

Saul Kripke. A puzzle about belief (1979) L 875-920, M3 382-409, M4 405-431

David Kaplan. Opacity. In: Lewis E. Hahn and Paul A. Schilpp. The Philosophy of W. V. Quine. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1986, 229-289

분야: Speech acts

J. L. Austin. How to do things with words. 2nd Edition. Cambrigde: Harvard University Press, 1975.

John Searle. Speech acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Part I.

H. P. Grice. Logic and conversation. In: Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989

간단한 문제들

  1. What is rigid designation? State and assess Kripke’s arguments that proper names such as ‘Aristotle’ and ‘Moses’ are rigid designators.

  2. State and assess the modal argument against descriptivism.

  3. What is Frege’s Puzzle? Explain how Frege attempts to resolve it in his ‘On Sense and Reference.’

  4. State the main features of Russell’s theory of descriptions and explain how this theory handles the puzzle about George IV.

  5. Explain the phenomenon of referential use of definite descriptions. Is this a problem for Russell’s theory of descriptions?

  6. Assess the following argument: 9 is the number of planets, Necessarily, 9 is odd, Therefore, Necessarily the number of planets is odd.

  7. Describe a Tarskian definition of truth for a simple language L, and assess the view that a theory of meaning for L can be cast in the form of such a definition.

  8. A sign reads “Thank you for not smoking!” Analyze this according to the theory of speech acts.

  9. Explain Davidson’s slingshot argument in “Truth and meaning”? What does it show, if anything, about the role of facts in the theory of meaning.

출처: http://www.phil.ucalgary.ca/philosophy/grad/language.html